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China’s Worldview and Ambitions
China and Inner Asia: New 
Frontiers and New Challenges
UNITED KINGDOM
Dr. David Kerr
Durham University
Inner Asia is an ambiguous region in the sense that sometimes it is there and sometimes it is not. 40 years ago Inner Asia had largely disappeared from view, obliterated not by one Cold War but three: the Cold War between the USSR and the West and the West’s clients in Central Eurasia - Turkey and Iran; the Cold War 
between the USSR and the PRC that began in the 1960s but intensiﬁed with China’s 
lean towards Washington after 1972; and the Cold War between China and India 
that began with the border war of 1962 but again intensiﬁed in the 1970s with Mrs 
Gandhi’s lean towards Moscow and the dismemberment of Pakistan. At that time 
Inner Asia had nominally four states - the USSR, PRC, Mongolia and Afghanistan 
- but since the latter two had very signiﬁcant Soviet military and intelligence presence 
in practice the region had two states and two proxies. At this time, therefore, Inner 
Asia was divided, isolated and militarized.  This division, isolation and militarization 
was particularly notable for China. China’s boundary in Inner Asia from the USSR, 
PRC, DPRK border in the Northeast round in an arc of some 16,800 kilometers to 
the India, Burma, PRC border in the Southwest was closed except for a single point 
of access to the interior of Asia over the Karakoram Range into Pakistan. So one 
principal effect of the multiple Cold Wars in Asia was to isolate China from interior 
Asia and to force its Inner Asian provinces into the role of Cold War frontiers. This 
Cold War Inner Asia has now been fully dismantled and the region has re-emerged 
in new conﬁgurations driven by internal, social changes and external, geopolitical 
changes. 
In external geopolitical changes the most signiﬁcant developments have been: the 
end of the USSR and the creation of sovereign Central Asia; the rise of China and 
India as modern Asian great powers; and the resurgence of Islam as a factor shaping 
the international relations of Central Eurasia and neighbouring regions. The primary 
internal and social changes have been: the emergence of some kind of civil society 
in post-socialist societies; the rise of new nationalisms in Inner Asia often drawing on 
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ethnic and religious solidarities, some of which are democratic and some of which 
are xenophobic and militant; and the development of new economic strategies for 
Inner Asia driven by activities like resource extraction, trade, investment and migrant 
labour. A further development that must also be noted is climate change, which 
will rise in diverse impacts in coming decades particularly through its effects in 
atmospheric warming, pressure on renewable water supply, and land degradation.  
These new forces - geopolitical, social, and environmental - will shape and deﬁne 
the region interacting with older issues in these societies to do with inter-ethnic 
identities and the relations between former empires and imperial subjects. The region 
now has eight states and within those eights states a number of signiﬁcant regions of 
rising importance. The states are Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, China and Mongolia. Regions of signiﬁcance are particularly 
the Inner Asian provinces of China, which can be variously deﬁned but typically 
Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai. 
The dynamics across Inner Asia between these states and regions are now interwoven 
with inﬂuences from external states, drawn towards the region by a number of 
interests in security and economics, and of course their need to manage their 
relations with each other. Of these external powers the most important are the US, 
Russia, India, Turkey, Iran and the European Union. China is in a unique position 
since it is the only state that is both internal and external to Inner Asia: it is internal 
on account of its Inner Asian provinces, but it has been historically and culturally 
external since the vast proportion of its population, economy, government and 
security focus has traditionally been in East Asia not Inner Asia. Therefore China’s role 
in Inner Asia deserves special attention. The status of being both inside and outside 
of Inner Asia presents the rising power of East Asia with unusual opportunities and 
risks. As part of the Inner Asian region it 
must have concern for the transnational 
politics of the region; as an international 
actor it must concern itself in the 
dynamic between internal and external 
powers, and in particular the ambitions of 
the US, Russia and India. 
China’s diplomacy towards Inner Asia is 
a complex mix of the new and old. In 
terms of tradition China’s diplomacy is 
as old as the frontier itself, and has taken 
typically three forms. From time to time it 
was necessary to conduct campaigns of 
punishment or extermination to pacify the 
“China’s role 
in Inner Asia 
deserves special 
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“
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frontier. More often China sought to organize and enrich the frontier societies since 
this was a far more economic means of securing the frontier than continuous warfare. 
Lattimore as ever states this most elegantly in his study of the Qing government’s 
frontier diplomacy towards the Mongols which favoured subsidy and sedentarisation:  
The system was one of the standard expedients in Chinese history, whatever the 
ruling dynasty, and by no means a Manchu invention. It kept the peace at an expense 
that was very small compared with the cost of frontier wars, and it stabilized the 
nominally nomadic society of the Mongols, because the regular payment of subsidy 
according to a classiﬁcation of greater and lesser chiefs demanded a ﬁxed habitat 
for each chief and his tribe. This promoted the demarcation of tribal boundaries, 
converting what had once been tribal followings into territorial principalities, in which 
the chiefs were no longer leaders of war-bands, but hereditary wardens of the “peace 
and order” which is always the frontier fetish of the central governments of great 
empires.1 
This system of managing peace and order on the frontier by enrichment and social 
organization had important normative aspects; by which I mean that Chinese 
diplomacy was strongly focused on forms of social and ethical propriety and ritual, 
including through the naming of things and people. This ordering by norms, naming 
and enrichment was always considered more desirable and economic than full-scale 
eradication which was only reserved for the most intransigent of cases.2 In this way 
the creation of the frontier was quite a different thing from the creation of a boundary. 
The Empires, Russian and Chinese, Ottoman, Persian and Mughal, did want to 
demarcate their territories - the Empire’s property rights - but these boundaries were 
lain upon an Inner Asian frontier that was more mobile and governed in China’s 
case by subsidy, by social organization, and by acculturation to Chinese norms. The 
reason why some parts of Inner Asia came inside the Chinese Empire and some parts 
were allocated to other Empires was a result of both kinds of politics. As this suggests 
China’s diplomacy has conventionally mixed organizational power of economy and 
security with forms of normative power that sought to repress unwanted ideologies 
and political movements and promote instead a narrative of China as a benevolent 
and civilising leader for the region and its diverse peoples.3 Following the none too 
successful attempt to create organizational and normative power for China under 
socialism, China has returned to this conventional mode of promoting ‘peace and 
order’ at the frontier and seeking expansion of China’s inﬂuence beyond the frontier. 
This engagement of the frontier allows China to expand its inﬂuence outwards, 
even as it agrees to demarcation of territorial rights with the former Soviet states and 
attempts to do this with India. 
China’s ambition to create new organizational and normative frontiers for itself in the 
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West is an important test case of China’s new great power status, therefore. This is 
particularly the case because if China can expand to the West then it can claim to be 
a Eurasian great power for the ﬁrst time, and not just an East Asian power. Two points 
need to be emphasized, however. First, we are still in the era of China’s emergent 
power: the organizational mode of expansion - by trade, aid, investment, resource 
extraction, logistical corridors, civilian and military infrastructures, and bureaucracies 
of an economic or security nature - are in the ﬁrst stages of development. This 
even more true of China’s normative power. Those who say that China is already 
a superpower need to accept that not only would China need to have more 
organizational power than it presently does, but we would have to have a much 
more clearly deﬁned idea of China’s normative purposes. These are arguably more 
important than the organizational structures of China’s power since it will be China’s 
normative character that will shape what the organizational power is used for. 4 It is 
best to say that at present the normative shape of China’s power is opaque, which is 
precisely why this space is open to such vastly different interpretations from peace 
and order to threat and instability.  The second critical point to note is that the new 
Inner Asia is quite different from the old. Empire has been the conventional form of 
government for Inner Asia but this cannot now come back. The interaction between 
the new geopolitical character of Inner Asia and the social changes within Inner 
Asian societies will shape the context of China’s power; and of course it will bring 
it into contact and competition with the organizational and normative resources of 
the other ambitious powers - Russia, America, India, and others - none of whom can 
afford to leave the new open frontier to be dominated by China. Therefore, China’s 
power in Inner Asia is undetermined within an undetermined region. China has new 
frontiers, new ambitions but also new challenges to meet. The rest of this paper will 
set aside the organizational prospects of China, which are being debated at length 
in other publications, to consider China’s role in the new normative politics of Inner 
Asia. 
The New Politics of Inner Asia
As noted China traditionally has governed the Inner Asian frontier by a mix of norms, 
subsidy, assimilation by culture, and repression of hostile forces; and it continues 
to employ these mechanisms in the new era of Inner Asia. The Beijing government 
deﬁnes those hostile to its rule in the Western regions of China as ‘three evil forces’; 
these evils being terrorism, religious extremism, and splittism.5 The claim of terrorism 
is directed against armed militants said to be attacking government agencies and 
civilians. The claim of religious extremism is directed against groups rejecting 
the Chinese government’s right to deﬁne, monitor and control religious activities, 
particularly of Muslims and Buddhists. The claim of splittism is directed against those 
who promote self-government, typically Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongols who say 
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that they are not ethnic minorities of a Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu) but proto-
nations entitled to self-determination. These forces are not unique to Chinese Inner 
Asia and are typical of political conditions in other parts of the region. Many political 
elites say they are battling against militants, against religious extremism, and against 
ethno-national separation, though the extent of these movements varies considerably 
and in a number of cases is being exaggerated by elites to justify authoritarian 
government and the use of repression and violence to maintain themselves in power, 
the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan being the obvious case.6 The extent to which the 
new of politics of Inner Asia is generating militancy, radicalism and independence 
pressures and the extent to which these are responses to authoritarian and arbitrary 
government is hard to determine. In Tibet and Xinjiang as in other Inner Asian 
societies what the government deﬁnes as the cure for political radicalization can 
often seem to be its cause. Nevertheless, China can use the common problems 
that elites face from anti-regime radicalism to create a channel for its diplomacy. 
This is, for example, one deﬁned function for its multilateral forum for Inner Asia, 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, founded in 2001 with Russia, China, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan as members; and India, 
Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia as observers. 
The point that is rarely mentioned by China and its partners is that a lot of the new 
politics of Inner Asia is democratic, in the sense that it emerges from a new civil 
society that is seeking autonomy and self-organisation following the long period 
of hibernation in socialist society. Broadly speaking three types of consciousness 
are rising in Inner Asia  - national, religious and democratic - and these combine 
in different ways. Sometimes the national and democratic combine giving rise 
to what are known as the ‘colour revolutions’; sometimes the religious and 
democratic combine as groups in society push for freedom of religious expression; 
and sometimes the national and the religious combine as Muslims and Buddhists 
use religious solidarity as a driver for national solidarity.  Of course, not all of this 
consciousness can be classed as civil and democratic; some of it is xenophobic, 
and even violent.7 It is important to remember that xenophobia means fear of the 
strangers we know - or at least think we know - and not fear of the unknown. In 
Inner Asia different ethnic and religious groups have histories of mistrust as well as 
histories of coexistence. Nearly all Inner Asian societies are multi-ethnic (Mongolia 
is an exception) so rising ethnonational consciousness can exacerbate traditional 
ethnic phobias within and across societies. This problem then mixes with another 
stemming from the imperial past. Since Inner Asia was governed in history largely 
by Empires the horizontal xenophobias between ethnic groups can be cross-cut 
by vertical xenophobias between former imperial subjects and imperial rulers.  In 
this sense imperial rule casts a long shadow over regional identities. The political 
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contentiousness of Inner Asia is multi-faceted, therefore. It exhibits rising religious, 
national, and democratic consciousness within societies and the challenge this poses 
to ruling elites. It also embraces problems of xenophobia on lines of either horizontal 
ethno-national cleavage or vertical post-imperial cleavage. Managing this complex 
contentiousness has become an issue in international, as much as, national politics. 
China has its own version of normative ordering and aspires to provide solutions 
for the contentious diversity of Inner Asia. Beijing seeks to promote ethnic harmony 
(minzu hexie) and talks about harmony within diversity (he er butong) enshrining this 
as one of the normative structures for the SCO process. But China also encounters 
resistance to its ordering along both the ethnic and post-imperial divides. One way 
to consider this is by contrast to the other great normative orderer on the Inner 
Asian frontier, Russia. Russian and Soviet rule over Inner Asia was authoritarian and 
brought many hardships, especially in the Stalin era; but it also brought economic 
development and aspects of European culture that were welcomed. Russia’s 
normative legacy in Inner Asia is bound up with the idea of a transcultural Eurasian 
identity - a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional identity that blurred distinctions 
between Europeans, Turks, Mongols and Siberians. Russia is able to use this cultural 
legacy to maintain a form of normative power in Inner Asia, and compensate for the 
fact that its organizational capacity is at a low historical ebb. If we ask what is the 
Chinese equivalent of Eurasianism, it is clear that there isn’t one. In Chinese Inner 
Asia Han Chinese and the other nationalities lead separate cultural, economic, 
religious and often linguistic lives.8 The same is true of Chinese living beyond the 
border, where being Chinese is viewed as being largely monocultural in contrast to 
the transcultural Eurasianism that aspires to transcend and mix different cultural and 
ethnic heritages. As far as Chinese are present across Inner Asia, especially taking 
up new economic roles, this can give rise to forms of post-imperial anxiety. Part 
of the anxiety is no more than demographic pressure. The total population of the 
region is above 180 million (assuming the deﬁnition of Inner Asia given above) of 
whom Han Chinese are the largest ethnic group at perhaps 60 million, with other 
groups in excess of 5 million being: Uzbeks at 28 million, Tajiks 15 million, Pashtuns 
13 million, Kazakhs 13 million, Uyghurs 10 million, Mongols 8 million, Russians 
6 million, and Hui 6 million. But the frontier is now much more open than in the 
preceding 50 years and societies feel demographically exposed to Chinese migration. 
To this perception of Chinese demographic pressure must be added memories of the 
Chinese hierarchical system of the past. The Chinese dynastic system placed China at 
the centre of its known order and in a position of superiority over frontier societies. 
The Chinese methods of subsidy, assimilation by culture, and, where necessary, 
punitive campaigns can still shape public perception of China’s contemporary power. 
None of this suggests movement towards anti-Chinese xenophobia on any scale; 
it does suggest that China faces resistance to its new movement into the frontier, a 
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movement all the more problematic because it encounters other major states moving 
into the same space.9  
As this suggests China’s normative ordering for Inner Asia is unlikely to be a matter 
of smooth progression. In distinction to those who see China expanding by means 
of normative or soft power the view from Inner Asia is either indifference to this 
project or actual resistance. Often Chinese normative power is seen as a potential 
mechanism for Chinese penetration of new nation-states that are in difﬁcult processes 
of establishing autonomous political identities and have long memories of imperial 
subordination.  The fact that key parts of West China - Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, 
and Tibet most obviously  - appear to be participating in the new Inner Asian 
politics of rising national, democratic, and religious consciousness suggests that the 
Chinese government will be more concerned with managing the internal part of the 
frontier than it will be engaged in expanding into the external frontier. As with past 
Chinese states achieving ‘peace and order’ on the frontier will remain a fetish for the 
central government; and many obstacles, internal and international, will have to be 
overcome before China can become a great power in the West. 
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